Suchergebnisse

One model of the Prisoner's Dilemma (R. C. Cunningham, 'Ethics & Game Theory: The Prisoner's Dilemma,' Papers on Non-Market Decision Making, 1967, 11-26) is applied to the withholding of farm products from the market. In recent yrs the Nat'l Farmer's Org (NFO) has attempted to augment farm prices & incomes by 'holding' actions, dramatized by dumping milk, burying hogs & burning grain. The NFO argued that if a sufficiently large number of farmers collusively restrict output, farm prices will rise & farmers will fare better individually. Only a few farmers were persuaded by this argument. It is shown that cooperative agri'al production withdrawals of the NFO have the attributes of a public good. Moreover, until the NFO offers private goods to an augmented & stabilized membership, it is unlikely that its lobbying activities will be effective. NFO efforts are analyzed as a form of Prisoner's Dilemma. It is seen that both price & game theory models predict the failure of collusive behavior which involves large numbers. In the game theory technique it is clear that the success of NFO boycotts is dependent on a sufficiently large number of farmers behaving irrationally. On the cost side each farmer (as a member of a large group) can refuse to support voluntarily the NFO's activity without reducing his opportunity to enjoy whatever benefits are forthcoming. No large org can support itself by providing a public good. It appears the NFO has only one alternative: it must build a large membership by providing private services to members only. Once it is very large & stable it can lobby effectively. But 'holding' actions will never be successful in effecting farm prices. M. Maxfield.